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The privatisation of public firms started to be significant in Spain from 
mid 80s onwards and has been conducted under two different Administrations: 
the Socialist Administration (1982-1996) and the Conservative Administration 
(1996-2004). Privatisation was especially intense throughout the 1996-2000 
period, when the large utilities and industrial groups, which rank at the top of 
the largest Spanish firms, were totally privatised. As a result, the participation 
of the public enterprise sector in the GDP has been reduced from 3% in 1995 to 
1% in 2002. According to OECD (2002) data, Spain’s privatisation programme 
has raised 38,401 USD million between 1990 and 2001, which ranks Spain on 
the fourth position among the European privatising countries. 
In this chapter we carry out an overview of the recent history of 
privatisation in Spain. At this point, the paper is focused on the analysis of the 
economic, financial and political objectives that the successive Spanish 
governments actually pursued. Likewise, we review the still very scarce 
empirical evidence on the economic consequences of privatisation on firms’ 
and markets’ performance, with a particular emphasis on the analysis of 
privatisation and liberalisation in the utilities sectors.   2 
2. The privatisation under the Socialist Administration (1983-1996) 
In Spain, the international economic recession of the 70s coincided with the 
start of the transition towards democracy after the Franco’s dead in 1975. 
Hence, the rationale of the government’s intervention in the public enterprise 
sector -hereafter PES- over the period 1977-82 was marked by the industrial 
crisis and social instability.  
The combination of the economic and the political turmoil led to the 
successive governments of the democratic transition to use the National 
Institute of Industry (INI), created during the Franco’s dictatorship in 1941, as 
an instrument to keep the employment and income distribution. As García-
Fernández (1990) argues, it was a time of political ‘solutions’ for business 
crisis. The nationalisation of a large number of loss-making companies led to 
the creation of a huge unprofitable PES suffering from overcapacity, 
overstaffing and chronic financial needs. The INI was configured as a 
‘hospital’ of firms with the most unwelcome prospects. 
The victory of the Socialist Workers Party (hereafter PSOE) in the 
general elections of 1982 initiated a period of successive Social-Democratic 
governments presided over by Felipe González. The first socialist cabinet 
implemented a set of global reform policies and intense sectoral adjustments. 
The stated aim of the government’s industrial adjustment policy was to adapt 
the Spanish industry to the changing economic environment that would lead to 
the integration of Spain in the European Community in 1986. The perspective 
to join the EC represented a formidable challenge for the Spanish PES, which   3 
was virtually bankrupt. First, it had to deal with the adaptation to the European 
competition policy, which required the elimination of subsidies and the 
dismantling of various public monopolies. Second, it implied the opening of 
the industrial sector to a more competitive environment.  
2.1. The rationalisation and reorganisation of the PES 
The first measure towards reforming the PES consisted of the introduction of 
profitability criteria and control mechanisms in the management of public 
holdings. Simultaneously, the state-owned sector was fully reorganised through 
a strategy of concentration of business lines around strong companies. This was 
part of the cabinet’s effort to build a set of national champions, capable of 
reaching leading positions in the world market. Up to then, the Spanish public 
industrial sector was mostly comprised of small and medium-sized companies 
by world standards. They lacked the size to compete in the international arenas 
with other European players and to access new markets and technologies, 
unable for leading the way for other Spanish business.  
Therefore, this was the time of the creation and the strengthening of 
large Spanish industrial public groups. Thus, the dominant position of the 
power generator Endesa in the electricity market was reinforced by the 
ascription of all the state-owned electrical companies. The iron and steel, 
aluminium and electronic sectors were organised around CSI-Aceralia, Inespal 
and Inisel respectively, through several mergers and shares’ exchanges. In the 
same way, the oil and gas companies that formed the National Institute of 
Hydrocarbons were consolidated into a single company, Repsol, which became   4 
the largest Spanish industrial company. Similarly, all state banks were merged 
into Argentaria to form the third largest banking group.  
Parallel to this strategy of concentration, the investment in public 
companies increased dramatically between 1985-1991. The investment effort 
concentrated on the telecommunications, transport and energy sectors. At the 
same time, the utilities sectors -and consequently the three state-owned bigs 
Repsol, Endesa and Telefonica, were protected from foreign and domestic 
competitors well after Spain’s integration to Europe in 1986. In this respect, the 
regulation of the energy sectors was clearly pro-industry biased, allowing the 
companies to keep all the productivity gains and cost reductions and thereby to 
increase their profitability rates (Arocena et al, 2002). The PSOE tried to make 
clear from the outset that it had no aim at nationalising any of these industrial 
groups and that they would contribute dividends to the public purse.  
2.2 Privatisation 
The PSOE had not in advance any privatisation programme after definition of 
objectives, criteria, sectors, companies selected, methods, guarantees for the 
process or general calendar. As Bel and Costas (2001) argue, privatisation 
rather was part of the strategy of rationalisation of the PES, and later on with 
the cash-rising objective to reduce budget deficit. At the beginning, socialist 
politicians were even reluctant to use the term privatisation and instead used 
other words such a disinvestment or denationalisation. As Claudio Aranzadi 
(1989) Ministry of Industry and Energy 1988-93 and chair of the INI 1982-88,   5 
declared, “the decisions of disinvestment of the INI do not respond to political 
or ideological reasons, but to criteria of industrial and financial rationality”. 
2.2.1 The early years: 1985-1992 
Firms firstly privatised shared some (or several) of the following features: (i) 
Small and medium-sized companies that had been nationalised during the 
transition towards democracy because of social or political reasons. This 
reprivatisation of these companies was then the logic consequence of the 
relinquished INI’s role as ‘hospital of firms’. (ii) Companies operating in 
competitive environments of little relevance in their respective sector. (iii) 
Companies that could no longer be competitive as PEs because of their lack of 
size, technological backwardness or insufficient distribution networks. The 
restructuring of these firms would have involved major investment. Instead, 
they were sold to foreign groups that would provide technology improvements, 
synergies and economies of scale. Such were the cases of the car-maker SEAT 
and the truck-maker Enasa, which were sold to Volkswagen and Iveco 
respectively. Table 1 lists all firms privatised during this period. 
 [Table 1 about here] 
The bulk of companies were directly sold each to a single buyer after 
financial restructuring involving outright grants under the context of the Plan 
of Restructuring and Reindustralisation, led by the Royal Decree-Law 8/1983 
of 30 November and the Law 27/1984 of 26 July. Under this Plan, the state 
administered monetary subsidies and compensations to laid-off workers, as 
well as to support labour relocation or early retirement programs. Comín   6 
(1995) estimates that over the period 1985-1994, the INI raised 1,833 million 
euros by the sale of publicly-owned companies, but had previously devoted 
2,290 million euros to restructuring. Likewise, some non-viable companies 
with substantial losses were liquidated due to the impossibility to find a buyer. 
Finally, as shown in Table 2, between 1986-1990, the government also 
sold blocks of shares of profitable PEs in the stock market, but with the firm 
remaining under the state’s control. The goal of these partial sales was to 
obtain cash to finance the capital needs of these firms, and thus avoiding to 
resort to the National Budget (Aranzadi, 1989; De la Dehesa, 1993).  
[Table 2 about here] 
2.2.2 The Maastricht Treaty and the State Budget’s deficit (1993- March 1996) 
In February 1992, the Treaty on European Union was signed at Maastricht. The 
Program of Convergence of Spain was presented in March of 1992 with the 
objective was to assure that Spain gain admittance to the third phase of the 
European Monetary Union. Additionally, the slowdown of the economic 
activity in 1992 forced the government to adopt a series of urgent budgetary 
measures through the Royal Decree Law 5/1992 of 21 July. The need to fulfil 
the convergence criteria and the economic recession required the reduction of 
the State budget’s deficit and the debt, which to a great extent marked the 
entrusted objectives to the public sector. Hence, from 1992 the sales of packets 
of shares of very profitable firms were significant (see Table 2). In fact, the 
income collected from these sequential IPOS accounted for 80% of the total 
income collected from privatisations under the socialist administration.   7 
The Program of Convergence also meant an important instrument to 
encourage the liberalisation of some economic sectors. Thus, it assigned the 
antitrust authority (Tribunal de Defensa de la Competencia) the task to 
elaborate reports on deregulation intended to increase the liberalisation of the 
Spanish economy. This impulse lead to the approval of deregulating measures 
in service and transport sectors and to lay the foundations of the liberalisation 
of energy and telecom sectors. Also, the approval of the Electricity Act in 1994 
established the first independent electricity regulator (the National Electricity 
Commission) and opened the way for liberalising the electricity market.  
The government had advocated its interest for maintaining a controlling 
share in the privatised companies. Besides, the socialist administration used the 
privatisation programme to create groups of stable shareholders, the so-called 
‘núcleos duros’, with the aim of keeping the control of the privatised firms in 
Spanish hands. This policy was intended to avoid losing the national 
sovereignty in sectors considered of strategic interest. To that effect, the 
Ministry of Industry issued guidelines to encourage the participation of the 
Spanish financial and industrial groups in the institutional tranches of the IPOs. 
This policy reinforced the power that financial oligarchy had traditionally in 
the Spanish economy (Lancaster, 1989; Rodríguez, 2000). Further, this strategy 
succeed in preventing any of these firms from being taken over by any major 
international player in these sectors, which arguably restricted capital market 
pressures to be efficient.    8 
In 1995, the government passed the Law 5/1995 of 23 March, described 
as the ‘legal framework for disposal of publicly-owned holdings in certain 
companies’. The law provided the government a tool to prevent eventual take-
overs in leading privatised companies: the golden share. This veto power was 
later on used by the conservative government –see next section- to frustrate an 
attempted acquisition of Telefonica by the Dutch company KPN in 1999. 
Golden shares are still in force in Telefonica, Endesa, Repsol, Indra and Iberia.  
Finally, some months later, the Royal Decree-Law 5/1995 of 16 June 
dissolved the INI and divided the state holdings into two groups: the State 
Industrial Agency (AIE) and the State Corporation for Industrial Participations 
(SEPI). AIE grouped a set of chronically unprofitable companies located in 
mature sectors subject to plans of industrial restructuring -mining, iron and 
steel, shipbuilding and military constructions- whereas SEPI was created as the 
shareholder of the most profitable public firms. 
3. The privatisation under the conservative administration (1996-2004). 
3.1 The ‘Program for the Modernisation of the Public Enterprise Sector’ 
The model of privatisation changed radically in 1996 following the victory of 
the right-wing People’s Party (PP) in the March elections. Under the new 
conservative Administration, Spain moved quickly toward privatisation, out of 
conviction and because it was a readily means for curbing the budget deficit. 
Thus, the first step of the new cabinet was the approval of the ‘Program for the 
Modernisation of the Public Enterprise Sector’, which set up the foundations of 
the government’s privatisation strategy.   9 
The program of privatisation created the Consultative Council on 
Privatisations (CCP) along with a new state holding company, the State 
Corporation for Property Participations (SEPPA) to hold the share packages 
controlled by the Department of Government Property. This new body along 
with the already existing SEPI and the AIE came to be called “Managing 
Agents of Privatisation Process”. The main function of the CCP consists of 
reporting on all privatisation issues brought forth by the managing agents. 
Particularly, it must judge whether each process and proposal of sale complies 
with the publicity, transparency and open competition principles. Likewise, it 
is obliged to inform on whichever questions raised by the government or the 
managing agents during the process of privatisation. 
The Program of Privatisation established the reclassification of state-
owned companies into four separate groups according to a calendar of 
privatisation. It set out immediate sale of the most profitable, while sale of the 
others was considered after they had been made profitable, except in those 
cases of extreme deficit in which any action to be taken was postponed. 
3.2 Full privatisation:  the ‘crown jewels’ on sale 
Privatisations carried out since 1996 have been channelled both through 
strategies of direct sale and public offerings and meant the sale of the largest 
and most profitable state-owned enterprises. Included here were such ‘crown 
jewels’ (a term widely used by the Spanish economic press) as Repsol, Endesa, 
Telefonica and Tabacalera. These operations accounted for an enormous 
amount of funds obtained from privatisation in comparison to that of the   10
previous Administration, as shown in Table 3. Hence, according to SEPI 
(2003) the State raised a total of 13,222.27 million euros between 1982 and 
1996. Between June 1996 and December 2003, SEPI privatised 48 companies 
and disposed of minority stakes in another 5 companies. These operations 
generated an income of 29,400 million euros, which were devoted to reduce 
national debt and according to estimates by Verges (1998), up to 75% of 
proceeds served to reduce current fiscal deficit. 
 [Table 3 about here] 
This massive placement of the shares of state companies contributed to 
the strengthening of the Spanish financial markets. Thus, the capitalisation of 
the stock exchange increased from 189,794 million euros in 1996 to 419,451 
million euros in 2002. While the State share in market’s total capitalisation 
declined from 16.64% in 1992 (10.87% in 1996) to 0.21% in 2001, the amount 
of shares of listed Spanish companies held by households -as a percentage of 
market capitalization- increased in the same period from 24.44% in 1992 
(23.59% in 1996) to 27.96% in 2001.  
Though privatisation extended share ownership to many people who 
had never owned shares before, the culture of a new ‘popular capitalism’ is far 
from being solidly founded among the Spanish people. Non-financial assets –
mostly real state- still accounts for 80% of the total assets held by Spanish 
families in 2002. Indeed, the proportion of financial assets has been reduced 
from 26.13% in 1996 to 20.30% in 2002.    11
The president of SEPI was clear in November 2000 when announcing 
in the Spanish Parliament that SEPI was expected to be completely privatised 
by 2003. However, current privatisation agenda does not include the coal 
mining group HUNOSA, the shipbuilding group IZAR, the Radio and 
Television Broadcasting RTVE and the National Railways RENFE, which 
altogether account for more than 90% of total state subsidies.  
3.3 Liberalisation, competition and the role of the European Directives 
  The PP Administration passed a number of important legislative 
reforms according to the liberalising principles of the European Directives. 
Thus, the approval of the Electricity Act at the end of 1997 placed the Spanish 
power market amongst the most liberalised in Europe, well above the minimum 
required in the European Directive 96/92EC (see Table 4). The same applies to 
the approval of Hydrocarbons Law (1998) and the Royal Decree Law of 
Urgent Measures of Deregulation and Increase of Competition (1999). The 
pace of market liberalisation introduced by these reforms was faster than the 
European Directive 98/30/EC concerning the common rules for the internal 
market of natural gas. The Hydrocarbons Law also created the National Energy 
Commission as an independent regulator overseeing all energy industries.  
[Table 4 about here] 
In the telecommunications sector, full liberalisation occurred in 1998 
through the approval of Law 12/1997 and Law 11/1998, which are the 
transposition of the successive amendments of Directive 90/388/EEC with 
regard to the implementation of full competition in telecommunications   12
markets. Similarly, the approval of the Law 24/1998, which is the legal 
transposition of the Postal Directive 97/67/EC, established the gradual 
liberalisation of the postal services. Though privatisation has not occurred in 
this sector, since 2002 two private newcomers -Via Postal and Unipost- 
compete with the state-owned incumbent Correos y Telégrafos S.A. in the 
incipient liberalised segments of the market, namely urban mail, intercity mail 
up to 350 grams and direct advertising. 
However, liberalising laws were undertaken together with decisions 
aimed to manage and protect the interest of national incumbents. Thus, some 
reforms were biased by previous agreements between the government and the 
companies, as in the electricity sector (Arocena et al, 1999). Further, following 
the privatisation of utilities, the state retained direct control over firm’s 
strategic decisions through ‘golden shares’ while persons close to the 
government were appointed as chairmen of privatised firms. Especially 
renowned cases were those of Telefonica and Endesa. At the same time as a 
number of independent regulatory bodies were created the Ministry always 
retained its administrative authority to intervene and to make the last decision 
in key operations like mergers, ignoring the recommendations of the regulators.  
In December 1999 the government passed a controversial law intended 
to prevent hostile take-overs of Spanish energy companies by foreign 
companies. The Budget Law 14/2000 included a provision that allowed the 
Spanish government to limit the voting rights in a Spanish energy utility of any 
shareholder being a state-controlled foreign company. This policy was shaped   13
by the government’s goal of preserving the Spanish ownership in strategic 
sectors -e.g. telecommunications and energy- (Expansion 4/5/2000; El Mundo 
19/12/1999). The government resorted to this law to restrain the take-over bid 
of Electricité de France for the electric utility Hidroeléctrica del Cantábrico.   
Finally, the policy of creating stable Spanish shareholders in privatised 
firms contributed to expand the complex network of cross participation 
between financial and industrial groups characteristic of the Spanish economy 
as described before. This has resulted in an enormous concentration of power 
in a few hands (Lasheras, 1999). As Arocena (2003) argues, the extensive 
cross-ownership among these firms generated a web of common interests, 
raising concerns about their ability to distort entry and competition.  
In this respect, Vergés (1999, 2000) argues that privatisation has not 
been used in Spain to increase competition by eliminating the former public 
monopolies, he rather states that monopoly positions still exist but under 
private ownership. Table 5 shows the Herfindahl-Hirschman index and 2-firm 
concentration ratios as indicators of the likely competitive potential in four 
industries affected by privatisation and liberalisation in the mid 90s. By any 
standard concentration is massive. High degree of concentration persists years 
after liberalisation and reflects the slow progress of competition in these 
sectors. This is very discouraging since economic theory suggests that 
competition rather than ownership leads to performance gains.  
[Table 5 about here] 
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4. Results and consequences of the privatisation process 
In Spain there are a number of studies on the performance differences between 
private and state-owned enterprises. They are basically based on the analysis of 
economic and financial ratios, and systematically show a superior performance 
of private firms (Cuervo 1989; Argimón et al, 1999). This is not surprising 
given that, as described before, since mid 70s the Spanish PES acquired a large 
number of private companies to avoid their bankruptcy and liquidation.  
By contrast, the empirical research about the effects of privatisation on 
the former state-owned companies is very limited. This scarcity is certainly due 
to the difficulty to obtain reliable data on Spanish privatised firms –particularly 
on the earliest privatisations occurred between 1985-1996, and because 
privatisation is an still ongoing process. Next we revise the existing literature. 
4.1 The impact of privatisation on firms’ performance. 
The first attempt to test the effects of privatisation on firm’s efficiency is 
offered by Sanchís (1996). To that purpose, he used a sample of 17 Spanish 
public firms that were privatised between 1985 and 1990. His results suggest 
that both competition and restructuring had a positive impact on productivity 
growth and that the effect of privatisation was relatively weak. Nevertheless, 
these conclusions should be taken with caution because (i) only five out of the 
17 companies included in this study were fully transferred to the private 
companies, and (ii) he only includes data for one year after their privatisation. 
Melle (1999) studies the magnitude of various performance indicators 
of ten firms before and after their privatisation. She examined changes   15
resulting from privatisation in the same set of economic variables analysed by 
Megginson et al (1994): (i) Profitability; (ii) Operating Efficiency: (iii) Capital 
investment; (iv) Output; (v) Employment level, (vi) Leverage and (vii) Payout. 
Her sample only included the major firms privatised through public share 
offerings between 1990 and 1999. The author does not reach conclusive results 
on the improvement of performance induced by the change of property. She 
also observes that her results might be biased because the firms included in her 
sample operated in sectors with different degree of market competition. This 
limitation is surmounted by  Villalonga (2000). She uses a sample of 24 
Spanish firms that were operating in competitive environments at the time of 
privatisation (between 1985-1993), so that no (de)regulation or liberalisation 
interferes with the estimation of strict privatisation effects. She does not find 
any statistical support either to the hypothesis that privatisation increases firm’s 
efficiency, measured by Return on Assets. She further claims that privatisation 
involves more than pure ownership effects and looks for other political and 
organizational factors that influence on the observed effect of privatisation on 
efficiency. Her results show that selling off the firm in a period of economic 
growth (recession), the foreign (national) nature of the buyer, large (small) firm 
size and high (low) firm’s capital intensity are factors that significantly 
reinforce (counteract) the effect of firm’s privatisation on efficiency. 
Finally, Cabrera and Gómez (2003) represent the latest and most 
comprehensive attempt to test the effect of privatisation on performance. As 
Melle (1999), the authors compare the mean and median values of various   16
firm’s profitability and efficiency indicators in the three years before and after 
privatisation. Interestingly, unlike previous studies their results show a 
statistically significant improvement following company’s privatisation, both 
on profitability and operating efficiency. These conclusions are of special 
relevance because the authors analyse the most extensive sample of privatised 
firms that anyone could construct in Spain. They examine 52 non-financial 
enterprises, which accounts for more than 45% of the total number of firms 
privatised in Spain -either by public offerings or direct sales- and more than 
95% of the total gross proceeds raised by privatisation between 1985-2000. 
However, the positive relationship between privatisation and firm’s 
performance is not statistically significant for the group of firms sold by means 
of public offerings, which includes the largest public utilities. This is 
particularly noteworthy, since its privatisation happened together with the 
liberalisation of their respective sectors.  
4.2 The effect of privatisation and liberalisation in the utilities sectors 
A common weakness of the cited studies is that they do not compare the 
evolution of performance of privatised firms with that followed by their 
competitors, who did not experience any change in ownership. Next, we carry 
out such a comparison for the main privatised utilities –Endesa, Repsol, 
Telefonica and Enagas-, which altogether roughly accounted for 60% of total 
gross proceeds raised from privatisation in Spain. Particularly, we compare the 
performance level of formerly public utilities before and after their 
privatisation with that of achieved by its private rivals, who simultaneously   17
faced the same change in the environment in the same time period -e.g. market 
liberalisation, technical change and/or demand growth for the whole sector, but 
not privatisation. Table 6 summarises the average of four key performance 
indicators for each utility and time period as well as their average growth rates 
relative to the corresponding sector.  
 [Table 6 about here] 
Figures clearly show that the four companies improved substantially 
their levels of labour productivity and operating efficiency (value added per 
employee and sales per employee) after privatisation and liberalisation. For 
example, first row in Table 6 shows that Repsol annually generated on average 
92,000 euros per employee before privatisation and 130,000 afterwards, both at 
constant 1990 prices. However, regarding the average annual changes our 
results show that post-liberalisation performance in labour productivity and 
operating efficiency for the group of privatised utilities was actually poorer 
than that achieved by their private counterparts. For example, the second row 
in column 2 shows that Repsol’s annual increase of sales per employee was 
11.7% higher than that of its competitors over the pre-liberalisation period but 
2.9 points lower following its privatisation.  
With regards to profitability, the picture is somewhat different. Thus, 
Endesa and Telefonica show substantial reductions in their Return on Sales 
ratios after liberalisation, which indicates lower prices and tighter profit 
margins. The opposite applies to Repsol and Enagas, which suggests that 
competitive pressure and/or price regulation was weaker in these sectors.   18
4.3 Prices and quality of service in the utilities sectors. 
Post-privatisation period witnessed substantial utilities price reductions 
together with an increase of the range of services and bill paying options. 
Relating price and service changes to privatisation is complicated by 
technological progress and, in the case of gas and electricity, variations in fuel 
input prices. Thus, in most countries telecom prices have fallen under state 
ownership in the 1990s as well as under private ownership. Similarly, lower oil 
prices in the 1990s have driven down gas and electricity prices in Europe, 
again irrespective of ownership. 
As shown in Table 7 the cumulative reduction of average prices of 
telecommunications services in Spain has been remarkable since market 
liberalisation. According to the telecommunications market regulator (CMT, 
2002), prices for fixed telephone services fell about 50% on average between 
1998-2002. The sharpest price reduction is observed for long-distance calls, 
which fell around 58% in the same period. Prices of mobile telephone services 
also declined by 30%. 
[Table 7 about here] 
Nevertheless, the price of telephone services and particularly 
Telefonica’s, are still relatively high in Spain. The Spanish Association of 
Consumers and Users (OCU, 2001) compared Telefonica’s prices adjusted by 
Power Purchase Parities (PPP) with those of the dominant players in 17 
countries (14 European countries plus Australia, Canada and USA) The study 
ranked Telefonica as the third most expensive company behind Portugal   19
Telecom and Telekom Austria. This even means a relative worsening of the 
Telefonica’s fifth position in 2000 ranking (OCU 2000).  
In the electricity sector, the energy regulator (CNE 2002) compares the 
evolution of electricity prices in sixteen European countries between 1997-
2002, that is to say since the liberalisation of the Spanish power market. 
Household tariffs decreased by 13% in monetary terms along that period, 
which ranks Spain at the top of the list of price-cuttings in Europe. Likewise, 
industrial electricity prices fell between 1997-2002. For the smallest industrial 
consumers the reduction was relatively moderate (about 5% in monetary terms) 
in comparison with that registered in the rest of Europe. By contrast, price 
reduction for largest industrial users was among the highest in Europe 
(between 10%-21% depending on consumer type). However, as in the case of 
telecommunications, the international comparisons of average prices (before 
taxes and converted at PPPs) show that Spanish domestic and industrial tariffs 
are the third and the fifth most expensive in Europe respectively. 
  Natural gas prices for the industrial sector were mostly stable during the 
1990s. However in May 1999 prices started to rise rapidly and by the 
beginning of 2003 industrial prices were about 40% higher than in 1994 (CNE 
2003). Households’ gas prices kept an increasing trend over the decade and by 
2003 average domestic tariff was 30% higher than in 1994. According to the 
International Energy Agency (CNE, 2001), average natural gas prices in Spain 
are the highest in Europe, both in the domestic and industrial sector.    20
Table 8 reports consumers’ satisfaction on six criteria for eight services 
of general interest in Spain as well as in the fifteen member states of the 
European Union. The criterion that provokes the greatest proportion of 
dissatisfaction is that of price. For example, first row in column II shows that 
only 32% of Spanish consumers consider that prices for mobile telephone 
services are fair. Prices for telephone, electricity and gas supply services are 
perceived as excessive by a majority of Spanish consumers. The level of 
satisfaction on this point is below the overall European mean. By contrast, 
prices for water, post, transport and rail services, which are supplied by state-
owned enterprises and municipalities, show percentages of satisfaction above 
those registered in the European Union. 
[Table 8 about here] 
Table 8 also inform about satisfaction regarding access and quality of 
service. Satisfaction rate of Spanish consumers concerning access is high. Four 
services out of the eight studied are easy to access for more than 90% of 
Spanish consumers. Rail services between towns/cities are easy accessible only 
for 71% of Spanish consumers, still above the overall European mean -61%.  
Further, a high percentage of Spanish consumers also regard themselves 
as satisfied with the quality of their services. On average, 83% of Spanish users 
declared themselves satisfied concerning the quality of services. Five services 
get higher satisfaction rates than the overall European average.  
However, the percentage of satisfaction is rather low concerning the 
clarity of information, fairness of contract terms and quality of customer   21
service provided by service suppliers. On average, two thirds of Spanish 
consumers are not satisfied with the information and customer service they 
receive from their suppliers and only 53% feels satisfied with the contracts 
made with service providers. In comparative terms, the Spanish consumers are 
less satisfied on these criteria than EU consumers except for city transport and 
rail services.  
Privatisation in Spain: A summing-up. 
My purpose here is to summarise in which sectors privatisation has 
failed or was successful. The consideration of failure and successful is very 
often ambiguous and subject to qualitative judgements in particular cases. First, 
early sales of public small sized companies were used to give back previously 
nationalised firms to the private sector. The state had rescued many firms in 
bankruptcy during the politically unsettled period of democratic transition. The 
economic and financial measures applied to these firms before its 
reprivatisation should be rather judged as a success of management under 
public ownership, since it allowed the survival of most of them. 
In terms of the impact of privatisation on firms’ efficiency, available 
evidence is not conclusive. It rather suggests that other factors are more 
important than pure ownership change, namely competition, the buyer type and 
the firm’s size and capital intensity. In these cases, privatisation always would 
play a complementary and reinforcing role (Villalonga, 2002). The cases of 
SEAT and ENASA in the automobile industry would be representatives.   22
By taking a temporal perspective over the last twenty years, the role of 
the public sector and the subsequent privatisation of state-owned companies in 
Spain reflects a story of socialisation of losses and privatisation of profits. 
Thus, the enormous financial effort made by the State in the creation of strong 
leading industrial groups following dramatic sectoral restructuring ended in 
their selling-off once they turned into competitive and profitable companies. 
This has been the case in the iron and steel sector (CSI-Aceralia), aluminium 
(INESPAL) and electronics (INDRA), which continue being competitive as 
private firms in their respective sectors.  
The same applies to the utilities sectors, where the high households’ 
prices for telephone, electricity, gas and oil products served to strength 
companies like REPSOL, ENDESA, GAS NATURAL and TELEFONICA 
under public ownership. Their huge cash-flows financed their Latin-American 
expansion throughout the nineties without incurring in state capital subsidies. 
On the contrary, the traditional loss-making companies remain in public hands: 
coal-mining, radio and television broadcasting, railways and shipbuilding.  
On the other hand, the governments’ liberalising effort resulted in a 
number of major legislative and regulatory reforms in many industries, 
sometimes even bringing forward or accelerating the timing established by the 
EU Directives. However, the government’s goal to obtain as large a financial 
contribution from privatisation to the budget as possible was achieved at the 
expense of market restructuring and consequently, of faster and effective 
market competition in newly liberalised sectors: oil, gas, electricity and   23
telecommunications. Putting in other words, while privatisation policy carried 
out by the government suited the goal of cash-raising to reduce the state 
budget, it was intrinsically incompatible with that of market liberalisation and 
increase of competition. It can be said that the Spanish process of privatisation 
reflects and has been marked by the conflict between the advocacy of market 
liberalisation and the protection of nationals’ interests. Thus, the formation of 
national champions led to the increase of the level of vertical and horizontal 
concentration in the utilities sectors and the corresponding reduction of the 
domestic rivalry. As the former president of the Competition Body and chair of 
the National Energy Commission 1995-2000, Fernández-Ordóñez (2000) 
argues, the anxiety for creating leading Spanish industrial and financial groups 
able to compete with foreign multinationals explains the inconsistency between 
the Spanish industrial policy and the pro-competitive policies. This 
contradiction has been shared by the different Spanish Administrations over the 
last twenty years, irrespective of their ideological divergences. 
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Table 1.  Total privatisations under the PSOE Administration 1985-1996 
Year  Company Name  Industry  Method Buyer  % share sold  Gross proceeds
 € million 

































































































Accionistas privados de Inisa 
Socios fundadores de Remetal 
Aluperfil 
Accionistas privados de Aluflet 
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Indonesia Coal and others 
Textil Guadiana 
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Enasa 
Fridarago 

































1992  Icuatro  Health   DS  Grupo Alegre  90  n.a 
1993  Automoción 2000 












































Naviera de Odiel/Mar. Valenciana
































1996  Sagane Gas  DS  Enagas  91  30 
Source: own elaboration on data from economic press and Cuervo (1997)   DS = Direct Sale;  PO = Public Offering.      28










 € million 
1985  - -  -  -  -  - 
1986  Gesa Energy  PO    39  54 
1987  TelefonicaI Telecommunications PO   6  282.5 










1989  Repsol I  Energy  PO  (BBV 
4%) 
30.6 939 
1990  Repsol II  Energy  DS  Pemex  5  191.8 
1991  - -  -  -  -  - 
1992  Repsol III  Energy  PO    10  420.7 















1994  Endesa II  Energy  PO    8.7  1,081.8 


























DS = Direct Sale;  PO = Public Offering   
 Source: SEPI (2003), Gámir (1999)  
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Table 3. Privatisation under the PP Administration (March 1996-2003) 
 
Year  Company Name  Industry  Method  Buyer  % share sold Gross 
proceeds 
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Alucoil, S.A.  
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Consorcio Jaén Oliva 
Fertiberia 
diverse 


























Sacyr, Banco Santander and others 










DS = Direct Sale;  PO = Public Offering; A = Auction 
Source: own elaboration on data from economic press, SEPI (2003) and Gámir (1999). 
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Table 4. Implementation of the European Energy Directives in Spain 
 
 
 Electricity  Gas 
Declared market opening by 2003  100%  100% 
Unbundling: transmission system 
operator/owner 
ownership ownership 
Unbundling: Distribution system 
operator 
legal legal* 
Regulation of network tariffs  ex-ante   ex-ante 
Overall network tarriffs  average  normal 
Number of transmission companies  1  1 






Competence on regulating access 
conditions 
ministry ministry 
Competence on dispute settlement  regulator  regulator 
Balancing conditions and charges set by  market  regulator 
Balancing period  60 minutes  Daily 
Power exchange  yes   
Intraday market possible  yes   
Transmission tariff structure    postalised 
Storage available for TPA    yes 
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  1994 1998 2002 
Electricity      
Generation     
HHI 2127  3550  3150 
CR2 59.5  78  74 
Distribution     
HHI 2086  3534  3210 
CR2 53  81  77 
Natural Gas      
HHI 8125  8200  5200 
CR2 97.8  95.5  78 
Telecommunications     
Fixed telephony     
HHI 10000  9570  6940 
CR2 100  99.7  88.8 
Mobile     
HHI 10000  5896  4060 
CR2 100  100  82.1 
Oil fuels     
HHI 3616  3310  2540 
CR2 79  75  66 
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Table 7.  The evolution of utilities average prices and Consumer Price 






s Electricity  Natural  Gas CPI 
1997  100  100 100 100 
1998  95 96  96  101.4 
1999  88 91  94  104.3 
2000  62 87  106  108.5 
2001  52 85  108  111.4 
2002  45 86  125  115.8 
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